Today, more than ever, the EU’s openness to foreign direct investment (FDI) needs to be balanced by appropriate
screening tools to safeguard our security and public order.

Without questioning Europe’s openness to FDI, the Regulation plays an important role in exceptional cases where
foreign investors seek to acquire assets which are critical to our essential interests.1 The Regulation has
equipped the EU with a framework and common criteria to identify risks related to the acquisition or control
of strategic assets, which threatens security or public order. In addition, it entails a cooperation framework between
Member States and the Commission. This underpins the assessment of FDI in Member States, and facilitates the
ultimate decision by the Member State where the FDI is planned or completed.

Even though FDI falls within the exclusive competence of the Union, Member States are allowed by the Regulation to
maintain screening mechanisms necessary to identify risks to security or public order arising from particular
investment transactions. However, without the EU cooperation framework, potential blind spots could exist in relation

The Commission observes that in the vast majority of cases the cooperation mechanism does not delay approval process at
national level (as confirmed by the public consultation undertaken in the summer of 2023 (see Summary results – Targeted
consultation on the evaluation and revision of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the ‘FDI Screening Regulation’), p. 20) . The vast majority
of cases are closed within 15 days (Phase 1). For example, in 2023, the Commission closed 92% of the cases in Phase 1 (source:
Fourth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union; for more details on the annual reports, see
under question 37). to “cross-border impacts” as the screening of an investment by a Member State may only take into account risks to
the national security or public order of the Member State where the investment is planned or completed. Thanks to
the Regulation, Member States and the Commission have a much better overview of foreign investments in
the EU as a whole.

In the internal market, a critical technology or infrastructure in one country may also be critical for its neighbours
and sometimes for the whole Union. Investments in strategic sectors may also have impacts on EU-funded projects,
like the navigation system Galileo, Trans-European Networks in the areas of energy (TEN-E) and transportation (TENT), or the EU’s research and innovation programme Horizon Europe.

The Regulation includes an indicative list of factors that Member States and the Commission may take into account
when assessing whether a foreign direct investment (FDI) is likely to affect security or public order. These factors
include effects on critical infrastructure, technologies (including dual-use items) and inputs, which are essential for
security or public order. Effects of an FDI on access to sensitive information, including personal data, or the ability to
control such information, or on the freedom and pluralism of the media may also be taken into account when making
such an assessment.

Member States and the Commission also take into account the context and circumstances of the FDI, in particular,
whether a foreign investor is controlled directly or indirectly (for example through significant funding, including
subsidies), by the government of a third country, or is pursuing State-led outward investment projects or programmes.

The assessment is conducted on a case-by-case basis.

No specific third country is “blacklisted” or “targeted” and no specific third country is “whitelisted” or “exempted” under
the Regulation. Concerns relating to security and public order can potentially arise from an FDI coming from any
jurisdiction. Non-discrimination among foreign (non-EU) investors is a key principle of the Regulation and the sole
grounds for screening a foreign investment are risks to security and public order, assessed case-by-case, regardless
of the foreign investor’s origin

Specifically, the Regulation defines ‘foreign investor’ as “a natural person of a third country or an undertaking of a
third country, intending to make or having made a foreign direct investment”. An ‘undertaking of a third country’ is
defined as an undertaking constituted or otherwise organised under the laws of a third country, i.e. any non-EU country.

No. The Union and its Member States have an open investment environment, which is enshrined in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and embedded in the international commitments of the Union and its
Member States with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI).

The Regulation is about identifying and addressing potential threats to security or public order, which may
be caused by certain foreign investments without reducing the EU’s openness to FDI or restraining the activities of
foreign investors in the Union.

It is for Member States and the Commission to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether a specific investment
threatens security or public order and, if so, to suggest appropriate measures to mitigate those risks. The
prohibition of an FDI should be considered only in cases where the mitigation of identified risks does not seem possible
by carefully considered mitigating measures

The EU framework is not fully equivalent to a national screening mechanism. Its aim is to help identifying and
addressing security or public order risks that affect at least two Member States, or the Union as a whole. It establishes
a cooperation mechanism between the Member States and the European Commission. It provides a formal channel
for the exchange of information to raise awareness on specific cases where a foreign direct investment (FDI) may
affect security or public order in more than one Member State, and to suggest steps to address the specific concerns.
This may be, for example, the case if a foreign investor is acquiring a holding company with subsidiaries in several
Member States where the acquisition of (indirect) control over those subsidiaries is subject to national screening.
Another example is if there is only one target company in a contemplated FDI, but it is selling goods and / or providing
services in several Member States whose security and / or public order might be affected by the contemplated FDI.

The COVID-19 emergency clarified some of the Union’s economic areas of vulnerability, including the resilience of our
critical industries and their capacity to respond to the vital needs of citizens.

As part of the overall economic response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Commission adopted in March 2020 a
Commission Communication providing guidance on the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation.
Against the backdrop of the public health crisis and resulting pressures on supply chains and evident economic
vulnerability, this guidance encouraged Member States to be vigilant in order to preserve EU companies and critical
assets, notably in areas such as health, medical research, biotechnology and infrastructure essential for our security
and public order. This should be done, of course, without undermining the EU’s general openness to foreign investment,
which remained crucial for the economic recovery in the aftermath of that crisis. The principles of the guidance issued
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic could be relevant as general guiding principles to be applied in a future
public health crisis, but of course the Commission will revisit this depending on the circumstances if such case arises.

Since March 2014, the EU has adopted a large number of restrictive measures (‘sanctions’) against Russia. The
sanctions are designed to undermine Russia’s ability to finance the war, impose clear economic and political costs on
those in Russia’s political elite responsible for the invasion and diminish its economic base. The EU also adopted
further sanctions against Belarus, in light of Belarus’ material support to Russia.

In April 2022, in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and in view of the sanctions imposed on
Russia and Belarus, the Commission adopted a Commission Communication providing guidance on foreign
direct investment from Russia and Belarus.

The aim of this guidance is to encourage Member States to exercise greater vigilance towards Russian and
Belarusian direct investments in the EU, which, within applicable FDI Screening rules, should be systematically
checked and scrutinized very closely. In the current circumstances, there is a significantly heightened risk that foreign
direct investment by Russian and Belarusian investors may pose a threat to security and public order. This goes beyond
investments by persons or entities that are subject to sanctions. Particular attention must be paid to the threats posed
by investments by persons or entities associated with, controlled by, or subject to influence by, the Russian or
Belarusian government, as these governments have a strong incentive to interfere with critical activities in the EU and
to use their ability to control or direct Russian and Belarusian investors for that purpose

Corporate transactions where the foreign investor and the EU target are owned or controlled by the same foreign
company that does not increase its ownership in the EU target may, in principle, not be considered as falling
under the scope of the FDI Screening Regulation and do not need to be notified under the cooperation
mechanism. Such transactions may occur when a company is undergoing internal restructuring; for example, a
holding company selling its participation in a target undertaking to one of its subsidiaries, or a holding company
separating part of its business and creating a new subsidiary, which would still be within the same group.

Investments where the ownership or control of the target company changes as a result of a change in ownership, or
control of its controlling entity, are covered by the Regulation. For example, the following two hypothetical transactions
would be covered under the cooperation mechanism:

1. Company A is established in Member State 1 and controlled by Company B in Member State 2. Investor C
   (established in a third country 3) is acquiring full (or partial) control over Company B: both Member States 1
   and 2 would have to notify this transaction to the cooperation mechanism, assuming it is subject to screening
   at national level in Member States 1 and 2;
2. Company A is established in Member State 1, and Company B is established in Member State 2 and they are
   both controlled by Investor C, established in third country 3. Investor D, established in the same third country
   3, is acquiring full (or partial) control over Investor C: both Member States 1 and 2 would have to notify this
   transaction to the cooperation mechanism, assuming it is subject to screening at national level by Member
   States 1 and 2;

The transaction falls under the scope of the cooperation mechanism if the foreign investor has the power to participate
effectively in the management or control of the target undertaking even if the foreign investor (i.e. ultimate controlling
entity) does not intend to exercise such power.

When Member State 1 and Member State 2 notify the transaction to the cooperation mechanism, the analysis
performed by other Member States focusses on the activities of the EU Companies A and B in their own countries and
the impact on security or public order in their territory. In addition, they will also use this opportunity to verify if
companies belonging to the same corporate group as EU Company A and EU Company B are present in their territory
and whether it requires any action under their screening mechanisms. In case other companies, outside of the EU, are
part of the same corporate group as EU Companies A and B and are part of the wider transaction, the Commission’s
assessment focusses on EU Companies A and B only

Cases which concern the transfer of ownership, or control, of an EU company from one foreign investor to another
foreign investor are covered by the Regulation.

Cases where the investment in the EU target involves a direct investor or direct investors established outside the
Union fall within the scope of the Regulation. Conversely, cases only involving investments by entities established in
the Union do not fall within the scope of the Regulation.

This does not mean that such transactions could not fall under the scope of the national screening laws of the Member
States, within the limits of the provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the right of
establishment and free movement of capital (Article 52 and Article 65(1) point (b)) which allow Member States to
maintain certain measures on grounds of public policy or public security.

The status of being established in the EU i.e. an EU company, is based, under Article 54 TFEU, on the location of the
corporate seat and the legal order where the company is incorporated and not on the nationality of its shareholders.
It does not follow from any provision of EU law that the origin of the shareholders, be they natural or legal persons,
of companies resident in the EU affects the right of those companies to rely on the fundamental freedoms provided
under EU law.

There is one exception to this rule. Investments by EU entities may nevertheless come within the scope of the
Regulation when they fall under the anti-circumvention clause.

The concept of “circumvention” is not defined by the Regulation; however, its Recital 10 specifies that anticircumvention measures “should cover investments from within the Union by means of artificial arrangements that
do not reflect economic reality and circumvent the screening mechanisms and screening decisions, where the investor
is ultimately owned or controlled by a natural person or an undertaking of a third country”. Thus, it would be relevant
to ascertain whether they are part of a scheme of circumvention set up with the objective result of avoiding the
application of the Regulation. Some foreign investors, for instance, state that the direct investor is a European holding
company that they have set up for the purpose of the proposed transaction. Thus, even if evidence of a subjective
intention to circumvent the Regulation is not available, the lack of economic activity of the investor company and
the objective capability of the arrangements to avoid the rules laid down in the Regulation are sufficient to
create the presumption that the arrangement is artificial.

The most common example of circumvention in the sense of Recital (10) is the case where a foreign investment into
the Union is channelled through an EU-based pure ‘shell / letterbox company’, which has neither directly nor
indirectly a genuine economic activity but serves solely the purpose of being the legal vehicle for the investment.

The absence of economic activity cannot be assumed but should be established in light of a global assessment of all
relevant facts, based on as much concrete evidence as possible, regarding factors such as the turnover of the EU
company, the number of employees, clients, physical presence / offices and the timing of its creation.

The existence of circumvention must therefore be established on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the specific
circumstances of each case and on the basis of relevant evidence.

Finally, in the case of investments by natural persons, cases where the investment is made by one or more natural
persons who are not citizens of the Union fall within the scope of the Regulation. Thus, the Regulation also covers
cases where the investor is a long-term resident in a Member State but not a national of a Member State.

The terms ‘security’ and ‘public order’ are not defined in the Regulation. Article 4 of the Regulation, however,
specifies the factors for consideration when determining whether an FDI is likely to affect security and public order.
These factors include the potential effects of the FDI on critical infrastructure, critical technologies, the supply of
critical inputs, access to sensitive information and the freedom and pluralism of the media. Aspects related to the
investor are also relevant for this assessment, such as whether the foreign investor is controlled by a government.

The interpretation of the notions of security and public order should be consistent with the relevant international
obligations of the EU under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the EU’s trade and investment
agreements concluded with third countries, as well as with the provisions of the TFEU on capital movements from
third countries.

Article XIV bis (1)(b) of the GATS allows WTO members to take any actions which they consider necessary for the
protection of their essential security interests in one or more of the following three situations: i) where they
relate to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning a military
establishment; ii) where they relate to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived; and iii) where they are taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.

Article XIV bis (1)(b) of the GATS allows WTO members to take any actions which they consider necessary for the
protection of their essential security interests in one or more of the following three situations: i) where they
relate to the supply of services as carried out directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning a military
establishment; ii) where they relate to fissionable and fusionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived; and iii) where they are taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.

Article XIV (a) of the GATS allows WTO Members to take measures necessary to protect public order. This
exception may be invoked only “where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental
interests of society”.

Article 4 of the Regulation includes an indicative list of factors that Member States and the Commission may take
into account when assessing whether a foreign direct investment (FDI) is likely to affect security or public order. These
factors are, for example, effects on critical infrastructure, critical technologies and critical inputs, which are
essential for security or the maintenance of public order. Effects of FDI relating to access to sensitive information,
including personal data, or the ability to control such information, or the freedom and pluralism of the media may
also be taken into account when assessing whether an FDI is likely to affect security or public order.

With regard to critical infrastructure in particular, under current EU legislation (the Directive on the Resilience of Critical
Entities7
), critical infrastructure is defined as “an asset, a facility, equipment, a network or a system, or a part of an
asset, a facility, equipment, a network or a system, which is necessary for the provision of an essential service”. Under
Article 6 of the CER Directive, Member States must identify their critical entities, i.e. critical infrastructure, by 17 July
2026, following a national risk assessment and applying the criteria provided by the CER Directive. To the extent that
the scope of application of the Regulation overlaps with the CER Directive, the identification of an EU target as a
critical entity should be factored in the assessment.

In the internal market, an infrastructure or technology critical in one Member State may also be critical for its
neighbours and sometimes for the whole Union. Investments in strategic sectors may also have impacts on Union-funded projects, like the navigation system Galileo, Trans-European Networks or the EU’s research and innovation
programme Horizon Europe. The list of projects and programmes of Union interest is annexed to the Regulation. When
needed, it is updated by the Commission by means of a delegated regulation

In their assessment of whether an FDI is likely to affect security or public order, it is also possible for Member States
and the Commission to take into account aspects related to the foreign investor, in particular whether the foreign
investor is controlled directly or indirectly, for example, through significant funding, including subsidies, by the
government of a third country, or is pursuing State-led outward projects or programmes. Furthermore, Member States
may take into account whether the investor has been involved in activities affecting security or public order, or whether
there is a serious risk of the investor being engaged in illegal or criminal activities.

The assessment shall be undertaken on a case-by-case basis.

The EU framework does not allow for the screening of foreign direct investment based on other concerns than
security and public order.

The Regulation applies to foreign direct investments (FDI) in any sector. It includes an indicative list of factors
that Member States and the Commission may take into account when assessing whether an FDI is likely to affect
security or public order, e.g. its potential effects on critical infrastructure, technologies and inputs.

The Regulation states that critical infrastructure includes energy, transport, water, health, communications, media,
data processing/storage, aerospace, defence, electoral/financial infrastructure.

Critical technologies include artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace, defence, energy
storage, quantum and nuclear technologies, nano- and biotechnologies.

The supply of critical inputs includes energy, raw materials and food.

Access to sensitive information, including personal data, or the ability to control such information, and the freedom
and pluralism of the media may also be taken into account, regardless of the sectoral activity of the investor or the
target undertaking.

The purpose of the Regulation is to identify and address potential threats to security or public order caused by foreign
direct investments (FDI).

Where a transaction establishes lasting and direct links between a foreign investor and an EU undertaking to which
capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity in the EU, the investment falls under the scope of
the Regulation. A public tender awarding a concession for the building and operation of critical infrastructure could,
for example, involve FDI and thus fall under the scope of the Regulation. Alternatively, the disposal of State assets,
for example, through a privatisation, may also constitute FDI when the investment grants the foreign investor the
possibility to participate effectively in the management, or control, of the privatised company (or business) carrying
out an economic activity. The acquisition of equipment or services from foreign suppliers does not fall under the scope
of the Regulation, unless the transaction would provide for the participation in the management, or control, of an EU
company.

Whether a specific public contract or concession might fall under the scope of the Regulation should be assessed on
a case-by-case basis, prior to the tender procedure. In view of the above, the Commission services consider that
competent authorities of the Member State in which the procedure is undertaken should also check whether the
contract to be awarded involves an FDI that should be screened on grounds of security and/or public order. The
Commission services also recommend that, where appropriate, the tender notice and/or tender documentation should
at the outset mention that the procedure, or the award of the contract, is subject to the FDI Screening Regulation or
that this Regulation applies to the investment at issue. This applies equally to all Member States, whether they have
a screening mechanism or not.

No. The Regulation confirms that the decision on whether to set up a national screening mechanism and design its
scope and process, or, where a national screening mechanism is in place, whether to screen a particular foreign direct
investment remains the exclusive responsibility of the Member State where the investment is planned or
completed.

The adoption of the Regulation triggered a constructive discussion about investment screening in Europe and several
Member States have been reforming their screening mechanisms or adopting new mechanisms.

In its guidance of March 2020 on the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation (see also under question 7), the
Commission called upon those Member States that currently do not have a screening mechanism, or whose screening
mechanisms do not cover all relevant transactions, to set up a fully-fledged screening mechanism. Thus, while there
is no legal obligation to do so, all Member States are invited to have a fully-fledged screening mechanism. This
invitation has been repeated by the Commission in subsequent communications, notably the guidance concerning
foreign direct investment from Russia and Belarus (see also under question 8)

No. The Regulation complements screening mechanisms of Member States and strengthens their
effectiveness. It is designed to help Member States and the Commission to collectively assess potential cross-border
threats to security and public order arising from a foreign direct investment. This is regardless of whether a Member
State has a screening mechanism or not. It does not substitute national screening mechanisms, where they exist. In
particular, the Member States make the final decision as to whether an investment is authorised (or not) in their
territory and under which conditions.

The Regulation applies to all EU Member States, regardless of whether they have a screening mechanism or not.

The cooperation between the Commission and Member States differs slightly depending on whether the foreign direct
investment (FDI) is undergoing screening at national level or not. If the FDI is screened at national level, the
Member State is obliged to notify the Commission and the other Member States by providing information on that
transaction. Where another Member State considers that this transaction is likely to affect its security or public order, it may issue a comment. Where the Commission considers that a transaction is likely to affect security or public order
in more than one Member State, it may issue an opinion. Comments by Member States and the opinion by the
Commission are addressed to the Member State where the investment is planned or completed.

Comments and opinions are not shared with the other Member States except where the opinion concerns an FDI likely
to affect projects or programmes of Union interest on grounds of security or public order. All exchanges under the
cooperation mechanism are subject to strict rules on confidentiality.

Member States can also issue comments and the Commission can also issue opinions on FDIs not undergoing
screening. This may be the case for Member States without a screening mechanism, or investments that do not fall
under the scope of the host Member State’s national mechanism. This can also be the case if a Member State decides
not to screen a particular investment. In that case, the host Member State is required – in the case of receiving
questions from other Member States or the Commission – to provide a minimum level of information without undue
delay through secure channels.

The final decision on whether a foreign direct investment (FDI) undergoing screening is authorised remains with the
Member State where the investment takes place. While other Member States or the Commission may raise concerns,
they cannot block or unwind the investment in question. When a Member State receives comments from other Member
States or an opinion from the Commission, it shall give such comments or opinions due consideration. This can be
done through, where appropriate, measures available under its national law, or in its broader policy-making, in line
with its duty of sincere cooperation towards the other Member States and the Commission.

No. The final decision on whether a foreign direct investment is authorised remains with the Member State where the
investment takes place. While other Member States or the Commission may raise concerns, they cannot block or
unwind the investment in question. It will be a matter for the national screening rules as to whether such action by
the host Member State is possible regarding an investment that has already been completed.

To allow businesses, the Commission and other Member States to understand how FDI is likely to be screened by the
Member State where the investment is planned, the Regulation provides a number of elements that Member States’
screening mechanisms should include. These mechanisms should at least include timeframes for the screening and
the possibility for foreign investors to seek recourse against screening decisions (the Regulation does not specify the
type of recourse that has to be made available i.e. judicial or administrative). Rules and procedures relating to screening mechanisms should be transparent and should not discriminate between third countries. Furthermore,
confidential information, including business-sensitive information, shall be protected.

It is possible for the Commission to issue opinions with respect to foreign direct investments not undergoing screening
if it considers that the investment is likely to affect security or public order in more than one Member State
or is likely to affect projects or programmes of Union interest. The Commission may also issue an opinion
where it has relevant information in relation to that investment. This may be the case for Member States without a
screening mechanism, or investments that do not fall under the scope of the host Member State’s national mechanism.
This can also be the case if a Member State decides not to screen a particular investment.

When the Commission considers issuing an opinion on an FDI not undergoing screening, it may request certain
information from the Member State where the investment is planned or completed. The Member State is required to
provide that information without undue delay through secure channels.

The duration of the procedure under the cooperation mechanism depends on whether Member States or the
Commission intend to provide comments or an opinion on the notified investment.

According to Article 6(6) of the FDI Screening Regulation, Member States and the Commission have 15 calendar
days from receipt of the notification to inform the screening Member State of their intention to provide
comments or an opinion. If no such intention is communicated within this period (15 calendar days), the procedure
under the cooperation mechanism is considered concluded.

When an intention to provide comments or an opinion is submitted without any request for additional
information, the actual comments or opinion must be provided no later than 35 calendar days from receipt of the
notification (see Article 7 of the Regulation).

When an intention to provide comments or an opinion is submitted with a request for additional information,
according to Article 6(6) last sentence, the deadline to provide comments or an opinion is 20 calendar days after
receiving the requested information. As a result, the total duration of the procedure under the cooperation
mechanism in that case depends to a large extent on how quickly the additional information is provided by the
screening Member State.

While the national screening mechanisms shall allow Member States to take into account the comments of other
Member States and the opinions of the Commission (see also under question 30), the Regulation does not foresee a
suspension of national deadlines during the procedure under the cooperation mechanism. Therefore, the national
procedure of a screening Member State, and the assessment of a specific investment, can continue while the other
Member States and the Commission review the notification relating to that investment.

Yes. While screening by Member States is usually undertaken before the completion of the FDI transaction, the
cooperation mechanism may be initiated within 15 months after the investment has been completed when an
investment is not subject to screening at national level. This may occur when the Member State does not have a
screening mechanism in force or when the Member State maintains a screening mechanism but the specific FDI
transaction was not submitted by the parties for ex-ante screening.

Furthermore, if a Member State launches the formal screening of an FDI, it is subject to the cooperation mechanism
irrespective of its planned or completed status (however, most mechanisms are based on ex-ante notification by the
investor).

All Member States are bound by the duty of sincere cooperation. Under the cooperation mechanism, a Member State
has to give “due consideration” to the comments from other Member States and the opinion of the Commission and
consider, where appropriate, measures available under its national law, or in its broader policy-making. This implies
that the host Member State needs to assess the comments received and/or the Commission’s opinion before it takes
a decision on a foreign direct investment (FDI).

In the context of projects or programmes of Union interest affected by FDIs, the Commission’s opinions must be taken
into “utmost account” by the Member State where the FDI is planned or completed. This means that, by default,
Member States must follow the opinion or provide reasons for not doing so.

The list of projects and programmes of Union interest is published as an annex to the Regulation. It was updated in
2020 prior to the full application of the Regulation, and it was again updated in 2021.

Projects and programmes of Union interest involve substantial EU funding or are covered by Union legislation
regarding critical infrastructure, critical technologies, or security of supply of critical inputs. They serve
the Union as a whole and represent an important contribution to growth, jobs and competitiveness for the Union’s
economy, such as Galileo, the Trans-European Networks for energy, transport and telecommunication, but also Horizon
Europe, and the defence industrial development programme.

The Commission keeps the list up to date by means of Delegated Regulations. In 2025, another Delegated Regulation
is likely to be adopted as well to take into account developments since the last update.

The cooperation mechanism is subject to strict rules on confidentiality as it concerns the security or public order
of one or more Member States or the functioning of an EU project or programme relevant for the security of the EU
as a whole. Screening undertaken by Member States is confidential and the cooperation mechanism respects the
same rule. Lack of confidentiality would make it difficult to share sensitive information, which is essential for a
meaningful cooperation.

Therefore, the Commission does not disclose any information related to individual FDI transactions, to the screening
of any FDI transaction nor to any opinion issued on any given FDI transaction. However, the Commission publishes an
annual report about the implementation of the Regulation, which is based on, e.g., annual reports submitted by
Member States to the Commission. The annual reports can be found here.

No. Businesses (investors or target undertakings) are not required by the Regulation to notify transactions to the
Commission or to other Member States. It is the Member State that undertakes the screening of a transaction that is
under an obligation to notify. This is without prejudice to obligations pursuant to other EU or national rules

Yes, if so requested by that Member State. The requirements for the submission of transaction-related information
by the foreign investor or the target undertaking are determined by the screening mechanism of the Member State,
and it is for the Member State undertaking the screening to make requests for (additional) information to the foreign
investor or target undertaking on a transaction subject to screening.

However, the Regulation requires Member States to provide certain information about the FDI transactions in their
territory undergoing screening as well as, upon request, about other FDI planned or completed in their territory. To
facilitate gathering relevant, specific and targeted information to enable a faster assessment by the Commission and
Member States under the cooperation mechanism of whether a foreign direct investment undergoing screening is
likely to affect security or public order in at least one other Member State, the Commission has prepared, in close
cooperation with the Member States’ FDI Screening experts, a template that Member States are encouraged to use
when notifying under the cooperation mechanism an FDI undergoing screening.

According to the Article 9(4) of the Regulation, Member States may request certain information included in this
template directly from the investor or the target undertaking, who shall provide it without undue delay. The template
that Member States may use to collect information from the investor or the target company is published
on the website of the Commission.

To facilitate the assessment by the Commission and the Member States of FDI transactions, it is in the interest of
investors and their advisers to provide complete and accurate information to the screening Member State where
the target company is established. The information to be provided about the target undertaking (section 3 of the
template) should be specifically about the target company/ies established in the screening Member State (and, if
applicable, the ultimate controlling entity of the target undertaking, if so clearly identifying which information relates
to the target company/ies established in the screening Member State and which information relates to the entire
target group).

It is clear that the information provided by the investor and/or the target undertaking in their notification to the
competent national screening authority of a Member State is an important contribution to the analysis by the other
national authorities and the Commission. Detailed and accurate information may allow the other national authorities
and the Commission to make the relevant assessment during the first 15 calendar days following the receipt of
notification of the FDI undergoing screening by the Member State where it is planned or has been completed.

Alternatively, if the information provided is insufficient, the other Member States’ authorities and the Commission
may have to seek further information while reserving the right to express respectively, comments or an opinion. Such
action may have the effect of prolonging the EU cooperation as long as the information requested by other Member
States’ authorities or the European Commission is not provided.

No. The Commission assesses risks to security or public order based on information received from the Member State
where the FDI is planned or completed, or from other available sources. While the Commission does not contact
investors or other stakeholders directly, Member States that are under obligation to provide information to the
Commission or other Member States, may request such information directly from the investor or the target
undertaking, which shall provide it without delay.

The template that Member States may use to collect information from the investor or the target company
is published on the website of the Commission.

The Commission reports annually on the implementation of the Regulation to the European Parliament and to the
Council. These reports provide aggregated information about the functioning of the cooperation mechanism while
protecting the confidentiality of information submitted by individual Member States on the implementation of their
national screening mechanisms. The Commission’s annual reports are publicly available on its website.

The Regulation encourages Member States and the Commission to cooperate with the competent authorities of
like-minded third countries on issues relating to the screening of foreign direct investments on grounds of security
and public order.

International cooperation may be pursued in bilateral or plurilateral formats, such as the G7 or the OECD. This
may include sharing experiences, best practices and information regarding investment trends. For example, the
Commission participates in the meetings of the Investment Screening Expert Group of the G7.

No. The Group does not discuss individual FDI transactions. See answer to question 40.

It is difficult to predict when the new Regulation will enter into force, as the legislative process is still ongoing. However, once the new Regulation is formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, there will be a
certain transition period during which the current Regulation will remain in force. The new Regulation will only apply
after a transition period to be determined by the co-legislators.